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HERE, THERE AND EVERYWHERE: MOBILITY 
DATA IN THE EU (HELP NEEDED: WHERE IS 
PRIVACY?) 
Raffaele Zallone† 
Abstract 
European law on data privacy has not clearly developed the 
concept of mobility data.  The evolution of technology has forced the 
EU to cope with this reality, but so far its legislation lacks a specific 
focus on this aspect of technology. 
A body composed of representatives from the various data 
protection authorities, the so-called article 29 Working Party (the 
name stems from section 29 of the European Data Privacy Directive, 
that calls for the formation and the task of this body) has coped with 
various aspects of mobile technology, but the documents and analysis 
it has produced are general and un-conclusive.  This is reflected in 
the general attitude on the side of industry, which seems to be more 
concentrated on getting access to as many data as possible, rather 
than taking European data privacy laws seriously. 
The European Commission has published its new proposed 
Regulation that, in the Commission’s plans, are bound to replace the 
old Data Privacy Directive.  The proposed Regulation, again, lacks a 
definition of mobility data, but its present wording is something the 
industry should look at very seriously, since lack of compliance with it 
(assuming it shall be enforced sometime in the not-so-far future) may 
be extremely costly. 
 
 
  
 
 †  Raffaele Zallone is the founding and managing partner of Studio Legale Zallone, a 
highly specialized firm in the IT business based in Milano.  He was General Counsel for IBM 
Italy from 1989 until 1997, when he started his law firm.  Mr. Zallone has been a professor of IT 
Law at the Bocconi University in Milano and Chairman of the ITC Committee of the European 
Lawyers Association (UAE).  He is the author of several books on IT contracts, privacy and 
internet.  Mr. Zallone and his firm focus on drafting and negotiating outsourcing contracts, 
intellectual property issues, e-commerce, and data privacy matters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the very moment of its foundation, the European Union 
(EU) has tried in every way to eliminate any obstacles to the free 
circulation of goods, services and people across borders.  In fact, the 
EU is based on what have been defined as the four basic European 
freedoms; these basic freedoms are: free circulation of goods, free 
circulation of capital, free circulation of services, and (last, but 
certainly not the least important) free circulation of people.
1
 The 
elimination of any kind of barriers and the possibility for people to 
offer their services and goods regardless of their place of origin has 
been the driving force of the European Commission from the outset.  
In essence, mobility is at the very heart of Europe; in order to foster 
growth and freedom, everyone and everything has to be free to move, 
work, and live wherever they see fit—people have to be able to move 
freely, and so do goods, services, etc. 
Needless to say that whenever people move, their data move 
along with them.  If a European citizen wants to move and work in 
any country within the EU, his or her data must follow him or her 
from the country of origin to the country of destination; therefore, 
making sure mobility is not restrained has always been a top priority 
for European legislators. 
It is for these reasons that the concept of mobility is clearly 
present and expressly mentioned in the title of the basic and 
fundamental law of Europe on data protection (the “Data Protection 
Directive”), which is set to regulate “the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data.”2 
It is fair to say that even though the mobility of data was 
conceived as a requisite at the outset of European legislation on data 
protection, European legislators could not have known how important 
mobility would become for data protection law, and most of all, how 
different the concept of data mobility would be from what it was 
originally foreseen to be in 1995.  For the sake of time, I shall not 
spend time describing the changes, the improvements, and the 
different progresses of technology that have increased the amount of 
mobility data available nowadays; we all know the technology, we all 
 
 1. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 
3.1, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173. 
 2. Council Directive 95/46, arts. 29-30, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
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use it and we all have it in front of our eyes.  I would rather start with 
examining the different aspects of mobility that are relevant to data 
protection law and how European legislators have dealt with it. 
I. WHAT PERSONAL DATA ARE MOBILITY DATA? 
A. A Possible Definition 
When addressing the issues raised by mobility data we need to 
ask ourselves whether there is a definition of mobility data under 
European Law that we can use as a reference.  The answer is no—as 
of today, European Law (and, to the best of my knowledge, any data 
protection law of any other country) has no definition of mobility 
data.  The closest one gets is European Directive 2002/58/EC, in 
which Article 2(c) defines “location data” as “any data processed in 
an electronic communication network indicating the geographic 
position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available 
electronic communications services.”3 
This definition makes no reference to mobility.  Eventually 
location data will turn out to be mobility data (if one knows the 
location of a data subject in any given moment and assuming in time 
the data subject has changed his or her location).  This definition is 
based on a static concept related to an object (the physical location of 
a terminal device), while mobility data, for the purpose of the analysis 
I shall carry out in this paper, are something very different. 
Importantly, the European Commission has issued the draft of a 
new Regulation, which shall replace the present data protection 
directive (Directive 95/46/EC).  The present draft of the new 
Regulation (at least in its present status) gives no definition of 
mobility data.
4
 
Because of a lack of a statutory definition and for the sake of 
common understanding, I shall refer to “mobility data” as personal 
data which indicate the physical places (and hence the movements) 
where a person has been in time and where personal data have been 
generated. 
 
 3. Council Directive 2002/58, art. 2, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 43 (EC). 
 4. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Draft 
Proposal], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
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B. The Traditional Notion of Mobility Data 
Using this definition, we can now examine the different kinds of 
mobility data.  First, we have the data derived from the physical 
movement of the data subject, i.e. the person whose data are being 
processed.  As an example, when one person travels or simply moves 
in different places of the same geographical area, the data derived 
from the use of  his or her credit card shall show charges related to the 
purchases made in the various places visited.  The fact that charges 
have been generated in location A and in location B show that the 
data subject has moved from location A to location B.  Another 
example is the passengers’ data processed by an airline—to board a 
plane, one must go through the check-in procedures.  These data show 
that passengers of any given flight were in city A before take-off and 
(most likely) will be in city B after landing.  In this case mobility data 
are not self-generated by technological devices, but are simply the 
result of the use of information technology (IT) to perform basic 
processing related to the business activity of the controller.  What has 
generated the data is just the physical presence of a person in different 
places in different times. 
Another kind of mobility data are data which are generated by a 
device that is associated to a person. Radio frequency identification 
devices (RFIDs) are a typical example of these devices;
5
 they also are 
the first example of self-generated data that have been examined 
under EU law (as we shall see later on in this paper).  RFID
6
 is the 
technology that allows one to pay the toll automatically on a freeway 
or when crossing a bridge without stopping at the pay-toll gate, or that 
allows employees to access different areas of an office and to open 
doors with a badge.  In all these cases RFIDs are associated with a 
person; therefore, the data generated from the device indicate the 
presence of a person in a given place at a given time. 
Global Positioning System (GPS)
7
 data are other examples of 
 
 5. For a summary description of RFID technology see Simon Holloway, RFID: An 
Introduction, MICROSOFT DEVELOPER NETWORK (June 2006), http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/aa479355.aspx. 
 6. For more on RFID technology see Roy Want, An Introduction to RFID Technology, 
IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING, Jan.–Mar. 2006, at 25; see also LARAN RFID, A BASIC 
INTRODUCTION TO RFID TECHNOLOGY AND ITS USE IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN (2005) (on file with 
author). 
 7. GPS provides location information on objects on the earth.  GPS Definition, 
BRITANNICA.COM, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/235395/GPS (last visited Nov. 
1, 2013).  The system is composed of a number of satellites and on ground receivers.  Id.  A 
GPS receiver calculates its position by precisely timing the signals sent by a satellite.  Id. 
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this kind of mobility data.  A GPS
8
 is, in essence, a satellite-based 
system that tracks the position and the movements of a given object, 
be it a car or a mobile phone.  In fact, GPS is a basic feature of many 
mobile phones, in that it allows location of the phone and the cell 
tower to which it is connected.  When the telephone moves along with 
its owner, the GPS constantly indicates its location and allows one to 
make/receive phone calls, mail, or messages in any place.  GPS is 
also a basic feature of some (but, probably of all smartphone 
embedded) digital cameras.
9
  It is now customary on the computer, 
when downloading pictures taken with a phone, to see the different 
places where every single picture was taken.
10
  This feature was used 
by the FBI to track and arrest a hacker of the “Anonymous” group 
who had just cracked a strategic military IT system.  In order to show 
off his success in cracking the system, the hacker had taken a picture 
of the screen and published it, which was enough to locate and arrest 
him!
11
 
Most apps available for download and use on our smartphones 
use location data, for one reason or another.
12
  Some applications 
could not work at all without being able to position the user—for 
example, one of the main purposes of Google’s Maps13 would be 
totally useless if it wasn’t able to exactly locate the user requesting 
data.  It is hard to conceive how it would be possible for it to indicate 
 
 8. For more information on GPS technology see Official U.S. Government Information 
About Global Positioning System (GPS) and Related Topics, http://www.gps.gov (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2013). 
 9. A feature called “geo-tagging” applies location coordinates to digital objects like 
photographs and other documents for purposes such as creating map overlays.  See Geotag 
Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/geotag (last visited Nov. 1, 
2013). 
 10. Apple’s iPhoto under the heading “Places” will show all the locations where the 
photos loaded on the Mac have been taken, a common feature now in many programs. 
 11. Photographic geo-coding combines position data with photographs taken with a 
digital camera, which allows one to look up the location where the photograph was taken.  See 
Diomidis D. Spinellis, Position-Annotated Photographs: A Geotemporal Web, IEEE PERVASIVE 
COMPUTING, Apr.–June 2003, at 72, available at http://www.spinellis.gr/pubs/jrnl/2003-PC-
GTWeb/html/gtweb.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 12. The information usually available on Apple’s iTunes Store is a brief description of 
the App, the name of the developer, the category it fits in, the date of the latest update and the 
version, dimension of memory required, compatibility and an evaluation based on feedback 
from users.  APPLE ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/charts/free-apps/ (last visited Dec. 16, 
2013).  No detailed technical information is usually available; in some cases, where a link with 
the developer is supplied, some more technical information is available. 
 13. GOOGLE MAPS, https://maps.google.it/maps?hl=it&tab=nl (last visited Aug. 24, 
2013). 
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the road to follow in order to get from a given place of origin to a 
required destination without knowing the location of the user and his 
or her movement in space and time.  The processing of mobility data 
generated from our mobile devices (phones, tablets, etc.) is the one 
thing data protection authorities are presently struggling with most.  
They haven’t come to any solution or proposal; in fact, I know of only 
one decision related to mobility data in any part of Europe so far, and 
it is a fairly recent development in the Netherlands.  It is a decision 
against Tom-Tom, a fairly common navigation system used in many 
cars, that was laid down in December 2011 by the CBP, the Dutch 
Data Protection Authority, which this Article shall analyze later on.
14
 
Again, if we stick to the definition given at the outset of this 
section, we can make dozens of examples of data that indicate the 
mobility of persons.  However, this definition is not and cannot be 
exhaustive.  The point is that, for all practical purposes, the 
assumption that mobility data only refer to the mobility of the data 
subject is fairly conservative since it only considers the physical 
movement in space of a person or of a device, and it reflects our 
natural attitude to consider things for their physical characteristics and 
dimension.  Since we live in a three-dimensional world, we consider 
only the variations of mass that can be noticed in space and time, that 
are derived from movement of people and devices in space and 
time—in essence, we stick to what we can see with our eyes (or what 
can be seen by someone else’s eyes). 
C. A New Paradigm for Mobility Data 
This is a limited way of addressing the issue and so I would like 
to make the point that technology has put in front of our eyes at least 
two additional cases to consider: cloud computing
15
 and internet 
navigation data. 
So far lawyers have examined the legal implications of cloud 
computing from many points of view.  Right now, for example, many 
are asking the following question: is there a limitation to the kind of 
data that can be put into the cloud?  Can a government organization 
 
 14. COLL. BESCHERMING PERSOONSGEGEVENS, OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION BY THE CBP 
INTO THE PROCESSING OF GEO-LOCATION DATA BY TOM TOM N.V. (2011), available at 
http://www.dutchdpa.nl/downloads_overig/en_pb_20120112_investigation-tomtom.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
 15. Cloud Computing allows the use of computing resources, on demand, through a 
network (usually through the Internet).  Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing 2-3 (Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech. 
ed., 2011). 
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use cloud computing in regards to data used to perform the tasks and 
the activities of public administrations, e.g. data related to the health 
of its citizens, their financial situation as reflected in their tax returns, 
data that indicate racial origin and the like?  Can a government 
organization use it for any other kind of data?  Public agencies and 
public administrations are examining what data can be processed 
using the cloud technologies and offerings that are now available 
everywhere and from many providers.
16
 
For what reasons are public authorities interested in examining 
cloud computing?  It is because it is not the data subject that moves in 
cloud computing technology, rather it is the data that moves!  Cloud 
computing techniques and technologies require data to move 
dynamically from one server to another, on the basis of the services 
requested and the availability of storage and/or computing power. In 
fact, data processed with cloud computing techniques can be stored 
and/or processed in any given device of an IT infrastructure, 
regardless of the country that originated the data or where the final 
customer resides.
17
  When the data are required for processing, they 
may then be moved to any device on the basis of available resources 
and/or computing power, thus allowing the provider to respond to 
every specific customer’s demand.  The servers or the storage devices 
where the data are moved may be in any given country of the world.  
The physical location and its nationality, in this technology, is not an 
issue, rather the issue is to better exploit the technology to better 
service customers. In our world of cut-throat competition, where 
industries try to save every possible nickel and dime, servers tend to 
be located in areas where manpower costs are lower.  We have seen 
the rise in outsourcing capabilities in India and other similar 
countries; the same is true for cloud computing.  In fact, with increase 
 
 16. Most recently the Swiss government has issued a bid through the University of 
Lausanne to ascertain what data held by a Swiss public administration could be stored or 
processed on cloud computing systems.  For additional materials and information on cloud 
computing and privacy implications, see DIDIER BIGO, ET AL., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, POLICY 
DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, FIGHTING CYBER CRIME 
AND PROTECTING PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD (2012), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&f
ile=79050 (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
 17. Indeed, this is the main difference between cloud computing and the traditional 
client-server model. Cloud computing resources are shared by multiple users because the 
technology allows the users to maximize their resources by allocating them to users in different 
time-zones.  Thus, for instance, during European business hours a given set of resources serve 
European customers, while the same resources serve North American customers during their 
business hours. 
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in competition and with new entrants on the marketplace, price-
sensitivity shall increase and the likelihood that servers be placed in 
remote countries with low manpower costs is going to increase 
accordingly.  This is not a trivial fact—data from rich and wealthy 
countries may end up in the hands of low-income, less developed 
countries.  This may not be a problem in and of itself, but the issues 
related to it need to be addressed and resolved from a legal 
perspective.
18
 
But let’s go back to mobility; in cloud computing there are no 
mobility data as I have tried to define them at the outset.  The issue is 
mobility of the data. 
The point is that moving data from one country to another is an 
act that has significant legal consequences,
19
 since trans-border data 
flow (when data moves beyond the boundaries of Europe) is regulated 
(at least in Europe) and has to follow certain rules.
20
  Therefore, 
regardless of where the data are generated, the fact that they may be 
moved from one country to another does create a data protection issue 
to be addressed and resolved.  What makes the case of cloud 
computing difficult to address is that the mobility of the data does 
depend on the basic operational decision and choices of the supplier 
of could computing services.  The location of data and their 
movement within the supplier’s infrastructure is mostly automatically 
driven by the software, and is independent from the location of the 
customer as well as of the location of the data subject.  It is probably 
correct to say that if the question was asked to most suppliers of cloud 
computing services, “Where are my data today?” very few would be 
in a position to answer that question quickly and correctly. 
Another case to address is internet navigation data.  Again, as 
stated above, I appreciate that we all have a view of the world which 
is functional to the physical side of our life: things move in space; our 
bodies are physical objects that move in space; in this very moment, I 
am writing this paper by hitting the keys disposed in the layout of the 
keyboard.  This is simply to say that our minds conceive movement as 
 
 18. For the legal issues raised by cloud computing, see W. Kuan Hon, Christopher 
Millard & Ian Walden, Negotiating Cloud Contracts: Looking at Clouds From Both Sides Now, 
16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 79 (2012). 
 19. Council Directive, supra note 3, arts. 25-26, at 45-46. 
 20. A standard contract has been developed to be used when transferring data outside the 
EU; this contract has been recently updated with the Commission decision of February 5, 2010.  
Commission Decision 2010/87 of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the 
Transfer of Personal Data to Processors Established in Third Countries Under Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5. 
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a physical act of an object in space.  When we surf the web from one 
site to another in search of information, we are not moving—our 
bodies remain in the same physical place (at our desk or in front of 
our tablet).  But while we sit and wait for the results of our 
navigation, the bits generated from our searches migrate from one 
device to another; electrical impulses hit different devices, bits are 
arranged in different fashion, and so our data move from one site to 
another one, with the final aim to give the users the data sought. 
Let me be clear: it is not the fact that bits and electrical impulses 
move from one device to another inside computers that makes the 
difference—bits, data, and impulses move continuously when we use 
a computer.  The point is that when moving from one site to the next, 
our data move from one server to another one, thus creating new sets 
of data (navigation data) that for all practical purposes can be 
regarded as personal data (remember, the Data Protection Directive 
defines personal data as “any information related to an identified or 
identifiable natural person; an identifiable natural person is one who 
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to a 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity”).21  In their trip to retrieve the data and the information we 
were seeking from the destination internet site, our data have moved 
from one server to another, creating a completely new set of personal 
data.  Once again, in the case of internet navigation data, as in the 
case of cloud computing, we have mobility of the data as opposed to 
mobility of the data subject. 
The last two examples show that we are facing new and different 
paradigms where the mobility focus is not on the data subject but on 
the data itself.  After all, the law protects personal data—if mobility 
of the personal data is induced by reasons different from the 
movement of the data subject, it’s still mobility and it’s still data.  For 
this reason navigation data, in my view, do fit within a possible 
definition of mobility data, upon the condition that we amend the 
initial definition to include the categories of data indicated above: (A) 
personal data which indicate the movements and the physical places 
where a person has been in time and where personal data have been 
generated; and (B) personal data which indicate Internet navigation of 
a data subject; and (C) personal data moved, stored, or processed 
from time to time in different locations. 
 
 21. Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 2, at 38. 
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II. MOBILITY DATA AND THE DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
Having set the stage in this way, what are the issues related to 
mobility data under European law? 
In order to answer this question, the basic principles of data 
protection have to be recalled, i.e. what the Data Protection Directive 
defines as the data protection principles.
22
  In essence, these principles 
are the following:
23
 
1. personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully; 
2. personal data can be held for one or more specified lawful 
purposes and shall not be further processed in any manner 
incompatible with such purposes; 
3. personal data shall be adequate and relevant and not excessive 
in relation to such purposes; 
4. personal data shall be accurate and kept up-to-date; 
5. personal data shall be kept for no longer than is necessary for 
such purposes; 
6. personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of 
the data subjects; 
7. adequate security measures have to be taken to protect personal 
data; 
8. personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory 
outside the EU unless that country or territory ensures an 
adequate level of protection for the rights and freedom of data 
subjects.
24
 
Let’s say that, for the purposes of this paper, the most relevant 
data principles are (A) the transparency principle (point 2): if anyone 
wants to process personal data, they have to state for which purposes 
they are going to be processes; (B) the purpose principle (point 2): 
personal data have to be processed for one or more specific and 
identified purposes; (C) the data quality principle (point 3): data must 
be “adequate and relevant,” i.e. one has to process data that are 
consistent with the purposes of the processing; and (D) the location 
principle (point 8): data can flow freely within the EU, but if they 
have to go outside the EU it must be into a country where there is a 
 
 22. Id. arts. 5-6, at 39-40. 
 23. Id. art. 6, at 40. 
 24. Id.  Most European statutes on data protection have the same data principles.  See e.g. 
Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 4, sch. 1 (Eng.); see also Decreto Legislativo, 30 Giugno 
2003, in D.Lgs., n. 196 (It.). 
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reasonable expectation that the data shall receive an adequate level of 
protection, comparable to the protection they receive within the EU.
25
  
This means that any entity processing mobility data must inform the 
data subject about two things: that the entity processes personal data 
of the data subject and for what purposes the entity is processing the 
data.  The data subject, depending on the circumstances (and on the 
law they are subject to) has to agree with such processing. 
There is no legal requirement under EU law to indicate what data 
shall be processed; therefore, it is irrelevant to indicate if one shall 
collect and process mobility data.  Nevertheless, since the relevance 
of data is one of the data protection principles, one must ensure that 
there is a fair and lawful reason to collect mobility data.  A phone 
company needs mobility data to provide its services and connect the 
customers wherever he or she may be.  In this case the processing is 
consistent with the scope of providing the services agreed upon and 
fulfilling the contract between the parties. 
On the other hand, an application called “Mirror,”26 which 
simply transforms the screen of a smartphone into a mirror (sort of), 
sends a warning stating: “Mirror wants to access your location data” 
(which means that as one moves, the app shall be collecting mobility 
data).  Under the data quality principle above, what is the relevance of 
mobility data to an application that is only supposed to transform my 
screen into a mirror?  What is the purpose of such processing and how 
does it relate to the function performed by the application? 
The fact is that nowadays, it is quite common to open an app and 
receive the message, “This app wants to use your location data.”  This 
means that the app, no matter what its purpose is and what function it 
is supposed to perform, shall collect mobility data of the data subject.  
Under the data protection principles highlighted above and European 
law, one has to ascertain the relevance of mobility data for such an 
application.  The question is not moot, because if the location data are 
not necessary and consistent with the purpose principle and/or the 
data quality principle, i.e. the data are not necessary to perform the 
function that the app is supposed to perform, collecting and 
processing these data could be against EU law.  Checking the 
processing of mobility data against the data principles, in the light of 
the function performed by an app, is fundamental to position it under 
EU Law and to decide how to proceed, whether or not consent of the 
 
 25. Council Directive, supra note 2, arts. 25-26, at 45-46. 
 26. ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/mirror/id390949350 (last visited Aug. 25, 
2013). 
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data subject is needed.
27
 
III. MOBILITY DATA IN THE EU 
Mobility data has been examined by several EU authorities. 
Article 29 of the European Data Privacy Directive has established a 
Working Group, known as the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party (WP29);
28
 it is composed of representatives of the national Data 
Protection Authorities.  The WP29 has a consulting function, not a 
legislative or a judiciary function; however, it exercises a significant 
role in data protection in Europe, because its document highlights the 
common position of the various authorities established in every 
member state. In 2005 the WP29 published four documents that deal 
with mobility data. The first one on RFIDs (WP 105)
29
 was followed 
by a public consultation on the subject and resulted in a second 
 
 27. Case law shows several cases where the processing was blocked because the data 
sought was totally unrelated to the purpose that apparently being pursued.  The website of the 
Italian Authority has almost ten pages of decisions and documents on the matter; for example, a 
company that supplies business information through a central database of all companies, as well 
as on individuals, was required to eliminate certain records from its files, since they were not 
considered pertinent under the law.  For more information, see GARANTE, 
www.garanteprivacy.it (search “pertinenza”) (last visited Aug. 25, 2013). 
 28. The directive provides as follows: 
(1) A Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Working Party’, is 
hereby set up.  It shall have advisory status and act independently.  (2) The 
Working Party shall be composed of a representative of the supervisory authority 
or authorities designated by each Member State and of a representative of the 
authority or authorities established for the Community institutions and bodies, 
and of a representative of the Commission.  Each member of the Working Party 
shall be designated by the institution, authority or authorities which he represents. 
Where a Member State has designated more than one supervisory authority, they 
shall nominate a joint representative.  The same shall apply to the authorities 
established for Community institutions and bodies.  (3) The Working Party shall 
take decisions by a simple majority of the representatives of the supervisory 
authorities.  (4) The Working Party shall elect its chairman.  The chairman’s term 
of office shall be two years.  His appointment shall be renewable.  (5) The 
Working Party’s secretariat shall be provided by the Commission.  (6) The 
Working Party shall adopt its own rules of procedure.  (7) The Working Party 
shall consider items placed on its agenda by its chairman, either on his own 
initiative or at the request of a representative of the supervisory authorities or at 
the Commission’s request. 
Council Directive, supra note 2, arts. 29-30. 
 29. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Working Document on Data Protection 
Issues Related to RFID Technology, 2005 10107/05 (WP 105) (EN), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 
25, 2013). 
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document (WP 111).
30
  The third document (WP 115) deals with the 
use of location data in the context of supplying value added 
services.
31
  The most recent document was adopted on February 27, 
2013 (WP 202).
32
 
WP 105 highlighted a heated debate between industry 
representatives, consumer groups, universities, think tanks, and trade 
organizations.  WP 105 set out some examples of processing personal 
data using RFIDs, for example a supermarket that tags loyalty cards 
or similar devices (which identify the holder by name) to learn 
consumer habits while in the store.
33
  Another example made by the 
WP29 was related to products which have been tagged with RFIDs—
a customer enters a shop wearing a product (a wrist watch) bearing an 
RFID, albeit not originally inserted by that shop; the customer’s RFID 
is scanned by the reading station of the shop which starts a profile of 
the customer so that when he or she returns to the store he or she is 
identified and the profile is updated with details of sections visited, 
products bought, etc.  Even though the store may not know the 
customer’s name (since the RFID was inserted in the wrist watch by 
someone else) the WP29 believed these were personal data.
34
  These 
examples have been strongly criticized by industry representatives, 
 
 30. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Results of the Public Consultation on 
Article 29 Working Document 105 on Data Protection Issues Related to RFID Technology, 2005 
1670/05 (WP 111) (EN), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp111_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 
25, 2013). 
 31. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Party 29 Opinion on the Use of 
Location Data with a View to Providing Value-Added Services, 2005 2130/05 (WP 115) (EN), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp115_en.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2013). 
 32. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 02/2013 on Apps on Smart 
Devices, 2013 00461/13 (WP 202) (EN), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2013). 
 33. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 29, at 5-6 (“one can consider 
the case where supermarket tags loyalty cards or similar devices, which identify individuals by 
their name to learn and record consumer habits while consumers are in the store”). 
 34. The WP29 explained: 
Take the hypothesis when person Z walks into shop C with a bag of RFID-tagged 
products from shops A and B. Shop C scans his bags and the products in it are 
revealed. Shop C keeps a record of the numbers. When person Z returns to the 
shop the next day, he is rescanned. Product Y that was scanned yesterday is 
revealed today; the number is for the watch he always wears. Shop C sets up a 
file using the number of product Y as a key. This allows them to track when 
person Z enters the shop, using the RFID number of his watch as a reference 
number for him. 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 29, at 7. 
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who, in response to the public consultation, made the point that these 
were not to be considered personal data. The WP29 did not issue a 
decision on the matter (since it has no decision power) but reported 
the dissent and concluded that data controllers using RFIDs should 
check the data protection principles and comply with them.  
Highlighting the importance of checking the processing of the data 
gathered with the RFID, the purpose principle, and the data quality 
principle,
35
 WP29 continued stating that consent was the legal ground 
to carry out such kind of processing of personal data.
36
  If consent is 
necessary, consent must be informed and as such information 
requirements must be met (i.e. the customer must be aware of the 
presence of an RFID tag on the product bought and of the entity that 
would process the related data and for what purposes).
37
  The public 
consultation highlighted that there was consensus as to the fact that 
the RFID’s should embed technical solutions (e.g. privacy enhancing 
technology or PET) to allow easy deactivation of the RFIDs by the 
retailers at the cash register level (i.e. the cashier should deactivate the 
RFID at moment of purchase).
38
  Needless to say that retailers and 
standard bodies for retailers “strongly disagreed” that the cashier 
should perform the de-activation of the RFID.
39
  Also, there was harsh 
criticism of WP 105 due to the fact that it did indeed stretch the 
notion of personal data in some of its examples,
40
 as well as the fact 
that some of the examples were not taken from real life, but mere 
hypotheses.
41
 
WP 115 on location data gathered in performance of value added 
services is quite interesting; it is a short document (11 pages, cover 
 
 35. Id. at 9 (“Data controllers collecting data in the context of RFID applications must 
comply with several data protection principles.”). 
 36. Id. at 10 (“Under most scenarios where RFID technology is used, consent from the 
individuals will be the only legal ground available to data controllers to legitimize the collection 
of information through the RFID.”). 
 37. Id. at 9 (Data controllers “must provide the following information to data subjects: 
identify the controller, the purposes of the processing as well as, among others, information on 
the recipient of the data and the existence of a right of access.”) (footnote omitted). 
 38. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 30, at 3 (“As concerns technical 
solutions that some consider should be in-built in [sic] RFID applications, respondents agree 
about the need for easy deactivation of RFID tags by retailers at the point of sale must be 
mandatory.”). 
 39. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 30. 
 40. Id. at 3 (“In particular, a number of respondents think that the various hypotheses 
described in point 3.3 of the Working Party 29 paper do not entail a processing of personal 
data.”). 
 41. Id. (“A repeated criticism of the paper is that the examples of RFID applications 
given in the paper do not represent reality.”). 
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and standard openings included) and it really is the first official 
document that addresses the world of smartphones, although the title 
does not explicitly state so.
42
  The technologies considered by the 
document are: devices used in the transport sector, GPS, credit cards, 
and mobile phones.
43
  The document distinguishes traffic data (data to 
locate the user and allow it to call or receive calls, as well as all data 
relate to phone calls made) that are considered necessary to supply the 
phone services, from location data that “provide key information 
about an individual” and have been quickly “viewed as a potential 
source of revenue.”44  After having addressed the legal framework 
under which these applications had to be evaluated—Directive 
95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC
45—as well as the issues related 
to applicable national law, the WP29 highlighted that in order to 
process data other than traffic data, it is necessary to obtain consent, 
but only after the user has been duly informed pursuant to Section 6 
and Section 9 of the Data Privacy Directive.
46
  Consent is not required 
when traffic data are processed in order to perform the services 
offered.
47
  However, it must be noted that WP 115 is quite fuzzy and 
confusing when addressing the issue of consent, in that at the very 
outset of addressing the issue of consent, it states that consent is 
required when sensitive data are processed.
48
  Although the statement 
in itself is correct,
49
 the point is that WP 115 does not indicate what 
sensitive data could be processed by using location data.  But most of 
all, after having made such an ominous statement, WP 115 does not 
address the issue of whether consent is required when sensitive data 
are not being processed.  It is therefore a significant disappointment 
to read a document from such a prestigious group and find such a 
grey area.  The result is that the document raises some issues that 
 
 42. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 31. 
 43. Id. at 2 (“Generally speaking, there are many ways of locating individuals, primarily 
using ‘traces’ left by the use of new technologies: automatic ticket machines in the transport 
sector, GPS, bank cards or electronic purses, or, in the case at issue, mobile telephones.”). 
 44. Id. (“[L]ocation data, insofar as they provide key information about an individual (in 
short, who is where), quickly came to be viewed as a potential source of revenue.”). 
 45. Council Directive, supra note 3. 
 46. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 31, at 4-6. 
 47. Id. at 6 (“Offering a service that requires the automatic location of an individual . . . is 
acceptable provided that users are given full information  in advance about the processing of 
their location data.”). 
 48. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 31. 
 49. Id. at 5 (“In accordance with standard practice for personal data protection when 
sensitive data are [sic] processed, European legislation requires prior consent to be obtained for 
processing location data other than traffic data.”). 
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appear to have little connection with the subject matter; and in doing 
so creates other questions and issues that are not addressed. 
IV. GEOLOCATION SERVICES OFFERED BY SMARTPHONES 
A. The WP29 on Geo-Location Services 
More interesting and more to the point is the document adopted 
by the WP29 on May 16, 2011, WP 185.
50
 
This document has ups and downs, so to speak. It starts with a 
description of the technologies involved (base station data, GPS, and 
Wi-Fi).
51
  The document then, per the standard format used in these 
cases, summarizes the legal risks of this technology, stating that geo-
location services can help gain “an intimate overview of habits and 
patterns of the owner.”52  But most disturbing is when WP 185 
(similar to WP 115) again makes the point that such location data may 
also include sensitive data.
53
  The examples made are vague, 
amazingly generic, and plainly wrong and misleading.  Is the mere 
presence of an individual in a hospital a sign of him or her being sick? 
Certainly not—one may visit a hospital for a dozen reasons, which 
have nothing to do with the health status of the data subject, just as 
one may go to a church for the wedding of a friend, without there 
being an indication about his or her religious belief. 
But let’s leave this example aside for a moment. The WP29 
highlights what it believes are the main risks of a given technology or 
situation in a section of its published documents titled “privacy risks.”  
Let’s then look at what risks are pointed to in WP 185.  First, since 
mobile phones are constantly linked to an individual (people keep 
them in their pocket or in their purse), they allow “provider[s] . . . to 
gain an intimate view of habits and patterns of the owner and build 
extensive profiles.”54  Second, “[t]he technology of smart mobile 
 
 50. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation Services 
on Smart Mobile Devices, 2011 881/11 (WP 185) (EN), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2011/wp185_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2013). 
 51. Id. at 4-6. 
 52. Id. at 7 (After noting that most people are indeed aware that mobile devices contain 
extensive intimate information, WP 185 states that “[t]his allows the providers of geolocation 
[sic] based services gain an intimate overview of habits and patterns of the owner of such a 
device and build extensive profiles.”). 
 53. Id.  (“A behavioural [sic] pattern may also include special categories of data, if it for 
example reveal visits to hospitals and religious places, or presence at political demonstrations or 
presence at other specific locations revealing data about for example sex life.”). 
 54. Id. 
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devices allows for the constant monitoring of location data” so that 
“from a regular travel pattern in the morning, the location of an 
employer may be deducted.”55  Third, “the unlimited global access 
creates new risks ranging from theft to burglary, to even physical 
aggression and stalking.”  And finally, a major risk is regarded to be 
the so called “function creep, i.e. the fact that based on the availability 
of a new type of data, new purposes are being developed that were not 
anticipated at the time of the original collection of data.”56 
Having stated in this fashion the most significant risks, WP 185 
clarifies that the legal framework to look at is the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/CE, but if a telecom operator offers geo-location 
services processing base station data, these services are qualified as 
public electronic communication services, thereby also falling under 
Directive 2002/58/EC of July 12, 2002 (the so-called “e-Privacy 
Directive”), later amended in November 2009 by Directive 
2009/136/EC.
57
 
On the other hand, companies that provide location services and 
applications based on a combination of technologies (e.g. base station, 
GPS, and WiFi ) are “information society services,”  and as such 
outside the application of the e-Privacy Directive.
58
 
Given the number of players in this scenario, WP 185 focuses on 
the subject to whom the legislation applies and who, hence, has the 
duty to comply with the law.  Since location data are a combination of 
data collected through Wi-Fi access points, GPS, and base stations, 
whoever collects these data processes’ personal data should be 
regarded as the controller and, therefore, must comply with the 
requirements of the Directives.
59
  In addition, application providers 
that offer applications capable of offering geo-location services are to 
be regarded as the controller and, as such, have the duty to comply 
with the law.
60
  Examples of these applications are weather forecast 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50.  As mentioned above, the 
risks are listed in paragraph 3. 
 57. Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:337:0011:01:en:HTML (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2013). 
 58. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50, at 8 (“[C]ompanies that 
provide location services and applications on a combination of base station, GPS and WiFi [sic] 
data are information society services. As such they are explicitly excluded from the e-Privacy 
directive.”). 
 59. Id. at 11-12. 
 60. Id. at 12 (“Such applications can process the location data (and other data) from a 
smart mobile device independently from the developer of the operating system and/or the 
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applications or applications that offer information on near-by places 
of interest, stores, restaurants, etc. 
Also the developer of the operating system of a smartphone, 
“when it interacts directly with the user and collects personal data 
(such as requesting initial registration and or collecting location 
information for the purpose of improving services)” can be a 
controller of data.
61
  These controllers are required to use privacy by 
design principles to help minimize the possibility of secret 
monitoring.
62
 
As far as the legal ground for processing, the WP 185 is quite 
sharp—the only ground for a controller to supply a value added 
service based on the processing of personal location data 
(independently if the controller is a telecom operator, application 
provider, or the developer of the operating system) is to seek and 
obtain prior consent, which must be informed and specific for all 
purposes for which data are being processed.
63
  The consent is also 
needed because when the default setting of the operating system 
allows for the transmission of location data, lack of intervention by 
the user does not imply consent.
64
  WP29 warns as to the lack of 
transparency that may exist and the lack of consistency with the data 
principles,
65
 specifically, that data  can be processed only for the 
typical purpose of the application.
66
  In this respect, the different 
controllers “must make sure the owners of the smart devices are 
adequately informed about the key elements of the processing in 
conformity with Article 10 of the Data Privacy Directive.”67  If the 
purposes of the processing change, new information must be given 
 
controllers of the geolocation [sic] infrastructure.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 12 (“As a controller the developer must employ privacy by design principles to 
prevent secret monitoring, either by the device itself or by the different applications and 
services.”). 
 63. Id. at 13. 
 64. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50, at 13 (“[T]echnical capacity 
should not be confused with . . . lawfulness.”). 
 65. Council Directive, supra note 2, at 40 (stating that personal data shall be processed 
fairly and lawfully, that personal data can be held for one or more specified lawful purposes, and 
that it shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with such purposes). 
 66. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50, at 15 (“The controller must 
make it very clear if his service is limited to providing an answer to the voluntary question 
‘Where am I right now?’, or if [his or her] purpose is to create answers to the questions ‘Where 
are you, where have you been and where will you be next week?’ In other words, the controller 
must pay specific attention to consent for purposes a data subject does not expect, such as for 
example profiling and/or behavioural [sic] targeting.”). 
 67. Id. at 17. 
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and new consent sought; in fact, WP 185 suggests that a good practice 
may be to ask renewal of consent at periodic intervals.
68
  Data 
subjects must be able to withdraw their consent in an easy fashion, 
without negative consequences regarding the use of the device.
69
  
Finally, the controllers must grant access rights to the data subject 
who, in principle, should have the capability to find out what location 
data have been gathered and the profiles that have been created on the 
basis of these data.
70
  Specific attention must be given by the 
controllers to the retention period.
71
  In this respect, the WP 29 is 
quite flexible, making a point and offering a way out to controllers; 
far from indicating a maximum retention period, the WP29 simply 
suggests that a retention period for the data be established.
72
  I know 
very well that this is a sensitive spot for many operators, but the 
whole point is that the law does not impose a given number; it simply 
asks that a period be determined.  It would be unwise to simply say, 
“Oh, well, we need those data forever;” yet, if this is the case, there 
must be a bulletproof legal rationale on which to base such a decision.  
This legal rationale must always be at the basis of whatever the 
decision is as to the period of retention.  It may very well be that the 
legal rationale is justified by technical reasons (i.e. my system would 
simply not work otherwise), but the technical grounds must be sound 
and bulletproof. 
B. A Recent Approach to Smartphones 
As mentioned above, the fourth and last document is very recent 
and deals specifically with the privacy implications of apps on smart 
devices.
73
  The document is quite articulate and specifically focuses 
its attention on consent, data principles, security of the data, 
information, and retention period.
74
 
 
 68. Id. at 15 (“The Working Party recommends that providers of geolocation [sic] 
applications or services seek to renew individual consent . . . after an appropriate period of 
time.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 17-18. 
 71. Id. at 18. 
 72. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50, at 18. 
 73. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 1 (the format of the 
document is the same as per the previous documents: the indication of the data protection risks, 
applicable law, legal grounds. In this case the document is quite articulate, in that includes many 
other sections that deal with purpose limitation, security, information, the data subject rights and 
the retention period, ending with conclusions and recommendation). 
 74. Id. at 5 (“The opinion focuses on the consent requirement, the principles of purpose 
limitation and data minimisation, [sic] the need to take adequate security measures, the 
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Initially the document briefly describes some of the main 
characteristics of the functioning of smart devices and the fact that 
many apps, through the application programming interface (API), 
have access to many of the sensors available on the devices and 
collect data continuously and perform a significant number of tasks.
75
  
The data collected in this fashion can be a base for additional 
processing of personal data.
76
  The risks are identified first in the 
fragmentation of the subjects involved and in the lack of knowledge 
of data protection.
77
  Four more risks are highlighted, such as first, the 
lack of transparency—users are unaware of the processing of their 
data which is taking place due to the simple fact of having 
downloaded an app!
78
  The other risks include the immediate and 
direct consequence of the lack of transparency: the lack of free and 
informed consent; poor security measures; and finally, the disregard 
of the purpose limitation principle.
79
  As to the applicable law, the 
document is quite clear—since the requirement for an informed 
consent applies to services offered in the community, applicable law 
is European privacy law.
80
  The personal data that are processed by 
the apps are quite significant and the list is quite impressive: location, 
contacts, unique device identifiers, identity of the data subject and of 
 
obligation to correctly inform end users, their rights, reasonable retention periods and 
specifically, fair processing of data collected from and about children.”). 
 75. The WP29 describes the data collection process: 
Through the API app developers are able to collect such data continuously, 
access and write contact data, send email, SMS or social network messages, 
read/modify/delete SD card content, record audio, use the camera and access the 
stored pictures, read the phone state and identify, modify the global system 
settings and prevent the phone from sleeping. 
Id. at 4. 
 76. Id. at 4 (“These data sources can be further processed, typically to provide a revenue 
stream, in a manner which may be unknown or unwanted by the end user.”). 
 77. Id. at 5 (“App developers unaware of the data protection requirements may create 
significant risks to the private life and reputation of users of smart devices.”). 
 78. Id. at 6 (“The lack of transparency is not limited to free apps or those owned by 
inexperienced developers as a recent study reported that just 61.3% of the top 150 apps provided 
a privacy policy.”). 
 79. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 6 (“Personal data 
collected by apps may be widely distributed to a number of third parties for undefined or elastic 
purposes such as ‘market research’. The same alarming disregard is shown for the principle of 
data minimisation [sic].”). 
 80. Id. at 8 (referring to Direct 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC, as revised by 
Directive 2002/58/EC, the WP29 stated, “It is important for app developers to know that both 
directives are imperative laws in that the individual’s rights are non-transferable and not subject 
to contractual waiver. This means that the applicability of European privacy law cannot be 
excluded by a unilateral declaration or contractual agreement.”). 
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the phone, credit card and payment data, phone calls, logs, SMS and 
instant messaging, browsing history, pictures and videos, biometrics, 
email and various types of access credentials.
81
  The four parties 
involved are: the developers of the apps, the developer of the 
operating system of the device, the app distributors (app stores) and 
the other parties involved in the processing of personal data.  In some 
cases the app store and the developer of the operating system tend to 
coincide.  End users may also play a part if they decide to share some 
information and data, for instance, to a social network, and thereby 
incur duties under data protection law if personal data are involved.
82
  
App developers may outsource some of the processing to third parties 
or share the information collected to third parties.  In these cases the 
mechanism to lawfully do so must be used to comply with the law, 
and if third parties are allowed access to data, they have to obtain 
consent from the user.
83
  Operating system developers and device 
manufacturers are also controllers for data processed to ensure 
smooth running of the device and since they develop the APIs, they 
have to apply the “privacy by design”84 concept.85 As for the app 
stores, they process payment history for apps and other purchases and 
as such require user registration, with all related data.
86
  Third parties 
have two kinds of roles: to execute operations for the app owner, or to 
collect information across apps and provide additional services.  
Depending on the capacity in which they act, they may be processors 
or controllers, and to the extent they have access or store information 
on the device, prior consent is required.
87
  As to the legal ground for 
processing, it is obvious that consent is required, and the main issues 
here are the transparency of the processing of personal data and the 
fact that the data subject must be informed of all processing carried 
 
 81. Id. at 8-9. 
 82. Id. at 9. 
 83. Id. at 10 (“If the third party accesses data stored in the device, the obligation to obtain 
informed consent of Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive applies.”). 
 84. Privacy by design is a concept that has been developed by Ann Cavoukian, 
Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada. The concept is based on a set of 
principles which aim at embedding privacy tools in the design and architecture of any given 
product, making it easier for users to gain awareness of their choice and protect their rights.  For 
more information, see PRIVACY BY DESIGN, http://www.privacybydesign.ca (last visited Aug. 
29, 2013). 
 85. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 11 (“OS and device 
manufacturers . . . have an important responsibility to provide safeguards for the protection of 
personal data and privacy of app users.”). 
 86. Id. at 11-12. 
 87. Id. at 12-13. 
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out; this is necessary so that informed and specific consent is given.  
“Implicit” consent may not be allowed and may not constitute a valid 
basis for processing.
88
  Another issue is the practice of tracking users 
behavior by advertiser or third parties.  The operating systems must 
avoid such tracking and avoid circumvention by advertisers.
89
  
Another section of WP 202 deals with the purpose limitation and data 
minimization.
90
  The purposes must be well-defined and consistent 
with the functions offered to the user, and the apps have to use only 
those data that are strictly necessary to pursue these functions.
91
  
Several suggestions are made to minimize security risks,
92
 but the key 
section is related to the information.
93
  The natural consequence of all 
the issues raised is that adequate information must be given to the 
user.  Now, what is to be considered “adequate information” in this 
context?  We have seen that there is potentially more than one 
controller
94
 in any given scenario, and so the identity of the 
controllers must be known; the purposes for which the data are 
collected must be spelled out clearly, as well as the fact that third 
parties may be involved in the processing of the user’s data, and what 
role and in which capability they are indeed involved.  This obligation 
is not merely on the developer of the app, but also on the app store.
95
  
The information may be given at the time the user decides to buy or 
download the app at the app store.
96
  If such identities are not known, 
 
 88. Id. at 15 (“simply clicking an “install” button cannot be regarded as valid consent for 
the processing of personal data due to the fact that consent cannot be a generally formulated 
authorisation [sic].”) . 
 89. Id. (“The default settings provided by OSs and apps must be such as to avoid any 
tracking, to allow users to give specific consent to this type of data processing. These default 
settings may not be circumvented by third parties.”). 
 90. Id. at 17 (Users have to “learn how their data are being used. . . The purposes of the 
data processing therefore need to be well-defined and comprehensible for an average user 
without expert legal or technical knowledge.”). 
 91. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 17 (“In order to prevent 
unnecessary and potentially unlawful data processing, app developers must carefully consider 
which data are strictly necessary to perform the desired functionality.”). 
 92. Id. at 18-21. 
 93. Id. at 22-23. 
 94. See supra p. 78. 
 95. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 22 (“There is an 
important responsibility for the app stores to ensure that this information is available and easily 
accessible for each app.”). 
 96. Id. at 23 (“The essential scope of information about data processing must be available 
to the users before app installation, via the app store.”).  “As a joint controller with the app 
developers with regard to information, app stores must ensure that every app provides the 
essential information on personal data processing.”  Id. 
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there is little possibility for the data subjects to exercise their rights.
97
  
And, again, retention period must be defined.  In this document the 
WP29 seems to be more restrictive in that it does give some examples 
of possible retention periods,
98
 but I once again underline the fact that 
the important factor is not merely the time of retention, but the 
establishment of a reasonable period of time.  The document’s 
conclusions draw some three pages of recommendations;
99
 it would 
be useless to list them all here.  The main point is that for the first 
time the WP29 has come with a significant document, which has 
addressed many of the issues that the previous document had 
apparently forgotten or overlooked. 
V. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
A. A Glance Into the Future: The Proposed EU Regulation 
Approach 
From the short summary of the documents published by the 
WP29 before WP 202 of February 27, 2017,
100
 I hope it is clear that 
there was little substance and a lot of theory.  The WP29 had issued 
documents that were very general in their nature and had failed to 
address any real issue.  Anyone who has bought a smartphone and/or 
has downloaded an application, for example, knows that real life is 
quite different from what the WP29 had depicted; there is very little 
information to data subjects (if any) and disproportionate use of 
location data (as I said above,
101
 why in the world does the “mirror” 
app
102
 or a “translate” app want to use my location data?  Why do 
they need it?  What use are they going to do with it?).  Unfortunately, 
the marketplace is dominated by US based companies, who leverage 
the fact that they are based in the US to avoid any of the duties under 
European law. 
This is not an advisable course of action to take.  If a company 
wants to do business in any given part of the world, it cannot avoid 
the responsibility and the duties that derive from such a decision.  For 
 
 97. Id. at 24. 
 98. Id. at 25 (The retention period for “data that are used once” per year could be 15 
months, while a navigation app could “store only the last 10 recently visited locations.”). 
 99. Id. at 27-30. 
 100. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32. 
 101. See supra p. 68. 
 102. See supra note 26. 
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instance Ferrari, the sport car maker,
103
 in order to sell its cars around 
the world, has to comply with each law of each country it decides to 
do business in and so does any other seller of any material goods.  
The fact that small (or not so small) companies refuse to adopt a 
simple, logical legal standard is certainly not a badge of honor for any 
such company.  Complying with the law should not be an optional 
feature, but a fundamental way of doing business.  The last document 
from WP29 clearly addresses most of these issues.  First of all, 
European law applies, which has been clearly stated and is a remark 
that many data protection authorities and many local European courts 
may decide to apply.
104
  Second, there is too little transparency with 
respect to these applications.  The consequence is already apparent—
the proposed draft Regulation on data protection
105
 addresses many of 
the issues highlighted by the WP29.  Section 5 of the Regulation has 
significantly changed one of the key sections of the data principles: 
personal data should be processed “lawfully, fairly and in a 
transparent manner in relation to the data subject,”106 which is a 
significant change compared to the present wording of the Data 
Privacy Directive,
107
 which states that personal data not be “further 
processed in a way incompatible with such purposes.”108  Compared 
to the Data Privacy Directive 95/46/EC
109
 the change is very 
significant and speaks loudly to whoever wants to listen.  When it 
comes to consent, it is up to the controller to prove that the data 
subject has expressed his or her consent.
110
  A new section called 
transparency and modalities has been added,
111
 which did not exist in 
the Data Privacy Directive.  It requires the controller to provide “any 
information relating to the processing of personal data” and that such 
information has to be given “in an intelligible form, using clear and 
 
 103. FERRARI, www.ferrari.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 104. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 8 (“[T]he applicability of 
European privacy law cannot be excluded by a unilateral declaration or contractual 
agreement.”). 
 105. See Draft Proposal, supra note 4. 
 106. Id. at 43. 
 107. Council Directive, supra note 2, at 40 (Art. 6, Sec. 1(a) states that data must be 
“processed fairly and lawfully.”). 
 108. Id. (Art. 6, Sec. 1(c) simply states that personal data should be “adequate, relevant 
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which  they are collected and/or further 
processed.”). 
 109. Council Directive, supra note 2. 
 110. Draft Proposal, supra note 4, at 45 (“The controller shall bear the burden of proof for 
the data subject’s consent to the processing of personal data for specified purposes.”). 
 111. Id. at 47-48. 
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plain language.”112  And finally, the section related to the information 
to the data subject has been amended as to include the obligation to 
inform the data subject as to “the period for which the personal data 
will be stored.”113  Finally, the controller has the duty to inform the 
data subject as to any further information necessary to guarantee fair 
processing.”114  It is clear that all these changes and new 
requirements, in one way or the other, are the consequence of the new 
technological scenario and that the issues addressed in WP 202 cannot 
be ignored anymore.  Of course, we are talking about a draft 
legislation, whose approval and implementation is still to come (if at 
all, for this matter), and there are a significant number of amendments 
proposed and waiting to be discussed and voted on at the European 
Parliament.  Regardless, these changes are the sign of a clear change 
in attitude from European legislators. 
B. Recent Cases on Mobility Data 
And, indeed, things are starting to change.  In Italy, the Data 
Protection Authority (Italian DPA) has examined several cases where 
the issues are related to geo-location services.  Italian Law
115
 has a 
specific procedure, the so-called “prior-checking procedure,”116 which 
allows companies to file a request with the Authority to examine and 
evaluate certain proposed processing of personal data.  The Italian 
DPA has the power to examine the cases submitted to its attention, to 
decide if the processing falls under the law, if it shows any issue of 
any relevance, and, in such a case, either to forbid or to prescribe the 
precautions or the measures to adopt.
117
  In this way any controller 
has an official seal on specific processing submitted to the Garante for 
prior checking and can negotiate specific instances and measures.
118
 
 
 112. Id. at 47. 
 113. Id. at 48. 
 114. Id. at 49. 
 115. Decreto Legislativo, 30 Giugno 2003, in D.Lgs., n. 196 (It.). 
 116. Id. § 17. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  The relevant text states: 
1. Processing of data other than sensitive and judicial data shall be allowed in 
accordance with such measures and precautions as are laid down to safeguard 
data subjects, if the processing is likely to present specific risks to data subjects’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms and [sic] dignity on account of the nature of the 
data, the arrangements applying to the processing or the effects the latter may 
produce. 
2. The measures and precautions referred in paragraph 1 shall be laid down by 
the Garante on the basis of the principles set out in this Code within the 
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One such case (probably the first one related to mobility data) 
regarded the use of GPS and other monitoring devices on buses.  The 
management of a bus company active in central Italy wanted to 
implement a GPS-based system that would have allowed the 
possibility to check the location of each bus, as well as provide 
information on a number of selected of items.  The system would 
have provided information as to speed, necessity of maintenance, 
degradation of specific parts, etc.  It was mainly a safety-oriented 
system, which the Italian DPA approved without significant 
limitations or requested measures.
119
  This was the first decision on 
such matters,
120
 and other similar decisions on similar cases have been 
subsequently adopted by the Italian DPA.
121
 
In another case, the Italian DPA simply issued a document 
stating that the system for which prior checking had been requested 
had no implications under the law.
122
  It was a request filed by the 
Alpine Rescue Organisation (Alpine Rescue), an organization which 
intervenes in cases of avalanches and the like.  The Alpine Rescue 
wanted to be able to have access to telephone GPS data, if available, 
in case of accidents, such as when GPS would be necessary to rescue 
people.  In light of the public interest of such operations, the Italian 
DPA stated that no consent was needed and that the proposed 
processing could be carried out without any issue.
123
 
In the Netherlands, at the end of 2012, an investigation was 
completed by the local data protection authority on Tom-Tom, the 
maker of navigation systems.
124
  It appeared that Tom-Tom was 
selling or somehow making available to third parties the navigation 
data of its users, without giving any notice to the users.  The Dutch 
Data Protection Authority (Dutch DPA) concluded that Tom-Tom had 
not been selling its customer data, but it had violated the local privacy 
 
framework of a check to be performed prior to start [sic] of the processing as also 
related to specific categories of data controller or processing, following the 
request, if any, submitted by the data controller. 
Id. 
 119. Air Pullman S.p.A., June 5, 2008 (It.), available at 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/export/1672796 (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. GARANTE PER LA PROTEZIONE DEI DATI PERSONALI, MOUNTAIN RESCUE (2008) 
(It.), available at http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-
display/export/1580543 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
 123. Id. 
 124. COLL. BESCHERMING PERSOONSGEGEVENS, supra note 14. 
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act, due to the fact that the consent to the processing of data is not 
sufficiently specific.  The Dutch DPA also concluded that the 
communication to third parties did not violate the law, since the data 
were given in aggregate form and since all references to individual 
persons had been deleted.  Nevertheless, Tom-Tom has had to change 
its privacy notice.
125
 
The cases indicated above and their very limited number show 
that the issues related to mobile technology are still far from being 
fully understood.  For the operators, this is tantamount to “so far so 
good.”  But what about the future?  Will this attitude remain as it is or 
is it bound to change? 
Well, first of all, all data protection authorities in Europe know 
what is going on and are just waiting for the right case to come along.  
A trigger is all it takes to attract the attention of the data protection 
authorities around Europe.  If one looks at what has happened and is 
happening to Google, one can understand many things.  Many local 
data protection authorities have opened an investigation of the Google 
Maps “Street View” feature;126 the application has also caused Google 
problems in Europe
127
 and elsewhere.
128
  Until recently, data 
protection authorities hardly dared to act against Google, even though 
it was very clear that many of Google’s practices were not in line with 
the law.  The present privacy problems of Google are an example of 
what happens when the authorities understand the issues and decide to 
act.
129
  And, as most lawyers in this field know, the problems are far 
from being over—the WP29 has been delegated by the other 
authorities to investigate Google’s new privacy policy, and things 
seem to be at a stalemate.
130
 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Google Streetview Cars Will Have To Be Clearly Marked, GARANTE PER LA 
PROTEZIONE DEI DATI PERSONALI (Oct. 25, 2010), 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1761443. 
 127. Germany: Google Fined Over Street View Privacy, SKY NEWS, Apr. 22, 2013, 
http://news.sky.com/story/1081382/germany-google-fined-over-street-view-privacy. 
 128. Adi, Robertson, Google Settles Street View Privacy Case with 38 States for $7 
Million, THE VERGE, Mar. 12, 2013, http://www.theverge.com/2013/3/12/4094522/google-
settles-street-view-privacy-case-with-states-for-7-million. 
 129. “Captured” Communications on Wi-Fi Networks: The Italian DPS Requires Google 
to Block Data Processing and Reports the Case to Judicial Authorities, GARANTE PER LA 
PROTEZIONE DEI DATI PERSONALI, Sept. 21, 2010, 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1751001. 
 130. GOOGLE’s New Privacy Policy: CNIL Sends a Detailed Questionnaire to Google, 
COMMISSION ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND LIBERTIES, Mar. 19, 2012, 
http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/googles-new-privacy-policy-cnil-
sends-a-detailed-questionnaire-to-google. 
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If and when the data protection authorities will fully open their 
eyes on the privacy issues created by mobile technology is hard to 
tell, and it clearly may depend on many circumstances; nevertheless, 
one cannot help but point out that when the new proposed Regulation 
on data protection replaces the old Data Protection Directive, the 
scenario shall be quite different.  Just one thing as an example may 
suffice: violations today are subject to relatively limited fines. While 
there are also criminal implications in some member states of the EU 
(Member States), no real case has been brought forward against 
Google (apart from the Vividown case,
131
 which ended up with 
Google’s officials’ acquittal).132 
The proposed Regulation calls for fines up to €1,000,000 or 2% 
of the total turnaround of the violating company.
133
  This starts to be a 
significant sum under any standard.  In other words, privacy laws 
have been around for the better part of the past 18 years and no one 
can claim ignorance of the law anymore (assuming that this was a 
good defense, in the first place). 
VI. CLOUD COMPUTING 
The WP29 has analyzed the privacy issues related to cloud 
computing
134
 and, although once again the issues of mobility data are 
not expressly mentioned, they are nevertheless examined.
135
  The 
document indicates that personal data are being processed in many 
different countries, and some of them may be processed in third 
countries outside the EU.
136
  The WP29 has no doubts as to the 
possibility of applying European data privacy law when the controller 
is located in one or more Member States.
137
  As mentioned above,
138
 I 
 
 131. La Corte d’Appello di Milano, 21 dicembre 2012, 8611/2012. 
 132. Oreste Pollicino, Google Versus Vividown Atto II: Eco le Motivazioni, DIRITTO 24, 
Feb. 28, 2013, 
http://www.diritto24.ilsole24ore.com/avvocatoAffari/mercatiImpresa/2013/02/google-versus-
vividown-atto-ii-ecco-le-motivazioni.html. 
 133. Draft Proposal, supra note 4 at 93. 
 134. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing, 
2012 01037/12 (WP 196) (EN), available at ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 
2013). 
 135. Id. at 2 (“[C]loud computing services can trigger a number of data protection risks, 
mainly . . . insufficient information with regard to how, where and by whom the data is being 
processed/sub-processed.”). 
 136. Id. at 6. 
 137. Id. at 7. 
 138. See discussion supra Part I.C.. 
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believe that personal data processed by means of cloud computing 
techniques fall under the category of mobility data; in this respect WP 
204 analyzes the transfer of data to third countries.
139
  Various 
alternatives are examined.  First, the possibility that the provider of 
cloud services is established in the US and has adhered to the Safe 
Harbour Rules.
140
  Having signed up for the Safe Harbour is not 
sufficient; a contract has to be signed detailing duties of both 
controller and processor.
141
  But the processor may be in a third 
country which does not provide adequate protection.  In this case 
standard contractual clauses have to be signed.
142
  Another alternative 
examined is the Binding Corporate Rules (BCR).
143
  A significant 
improvement has occurred recently with the opening of the BCR 
procedures for data, which apply to employees as well as 
customers.
144
  BCR are procedures adopted by Member States to 
allow mobility of personal data within a company that adopts a code 
of conduct, binding on its employees in any country in the world.
145
  
Once the BCR have been adopted, they have to be submitted to a 
competent data protection authority in Europe, as defined by WP 
195.
146
  This authority can negotiate on behalf of all the other 
authorities and, if necessary, can negotiate (along with two other 
authorities) the text of the BCR.
147
  Once the BCRs are approved, 
each individual authority in any given country then authorizes the 
transfer of the data within the company, regardless of the country in 
 
 139. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 134, at 17. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Council Directive, supra note 2, at 43. 
 142. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 134, at 18. 
 143. Id. at 19. 
 144. For more information on Binding Corporate Rules, see Overview on Binding 
Corporate Rules, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/international-transfers/binding-corporate-rules/index_en.htm (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2013). 
 145. There are over 30 multinational companies (including an international law firm) 
whose BCRs have been submitted to local authorities and have been approved.  For the full list 
see List of Companies for Which the EU BCR Cooperation Procedure is Closed, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-
transfers/binding-corporate-rules/bcr_cooperation/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
 146. The WP29 published WP 195 in 2012 with its recommendation on a standard form 
for approval of the BCRs.  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document 
02/2012 Setting Up a Table with the Elements and Principles to be Found in Processor Binding 
Corporate Rules, 2012 01037/12 (WP 196) (EN), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp195_en.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
 147. Id. 
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the world where the data shall be transferred to.
148
  This is the perfect 
procedure to follow in case of cloud computing processing of 
personal data.  In this respect the issue of “where are my data” 
becomes meaningless, since the data can circulate freely within the 
organization.  There are drawbacks, of course (e.g. the use of 
subcontractors can be an issue), but the main advantage is the forum 
shopping; a company can choose the lead authority of the country it 
prefers and negotiate with it.  Adopting a BCR is a much more 
powerful and reliable way of transferring data (regardless of the use 
of cloud computing), since it is a simplified procedure and the 
advantages gained are significant.  In addition, I strongly believe that 
establishing  contact and communication with the local authority, 
regardless of the country one operates in, is always positive and gives 
added value to any other process related to the evaluation of how 
personal data are being processed.
149
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Presently, EU data protection legislation does not address mobile 
technology as such.  There is no definition of what mobility data are, 
and none is called for in the draft Regulation presently being debated. 
Only the WP29 has examined some aspects of mobility data, but in a 
very general fashion
150
 at the outset and only to analyze the issue in 
more detail very recently.
151
 
This unsatisfactory status is reflected in the little attention given 
so far to the processing of mobility data by national authorities.  This 
may not be an issue by itself, but leaves significant questions yet to be 
answered. 
The main issue is the following: mobility data are regulated by 
the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) which is based 
mostly on the Strasbourg Convention.  The Strasbourg Convention 
 
 148. The WP29 has published several documents on BCRs, namely WPs: 74, 107 and 108 
between 2003 and 2005; more recently, in 2008, three new documents have been published: 
WPs 153, 154 and 155.  Opinions and Recommendations, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/index_en.htm#h2-2 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).  For a comprehensive listing 
of the WP29’s documents see id. 
 149. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Explanatory Document on the Processor 
Binding Corporate Rules, 2013 00658/13 (WP 204) (EN), available at ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp204_en.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
 150. See discussion supra Part III. 
 151. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32. 
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was signed in 1981, and everyone with some experience in this field 
knows that an international treaty of this kind is between 3 to 6 years 
in the making.  This means that the Strasbourg Convention reflects 
the IT world of the mid-seventies when distributed processing, the 
first form of networking that developed in contrast to the dominance 
of the IBM mainframe architecture, was barely emerging.  In few 
words, this means that a technology that has emerged and evolved in 
the third millennium is subject to a law which is not simply obsolete, 
but was conceived in an era when mobile phones, GPS, tablets and 
the like simply did not exist.  This is what I mean when I say that the 
present status is unsatisfactory.  Legislators, therefore, have to wake 
up quickly and act, if they are serious about protecting the privacy 
rights of the citizens. 
 Having said this, in the wake of the new Regulation, controllers 
better clean up their act in this field.  Faulty information notices (if 
any at all), refusal to answer any questions whatsoever by the part of 
the data subject, a general attitude that gives the impression of lack of 
care on the themes of privacy is not acceptable and is something that, 
under the new Regulation, may be very costly. 
